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it is because to write of the latter in this place would be but to summarize the book itself. George Sylvester Morris was leaving Dartmouth College just as the Civil War was breaking out. Twenty years later he assumed the Chair of Ethics and History of Philosophy in the University of Michigan. In 1889 came his untimely death. During this period, a much greater transformation came over America than it is even yet possible to realize. Mr. Morris suffered the spiritual conflicts of the transition. For himself he achieved, by means of a combination of Greek and German thought, a triumphant reconciliation of traditional religion with rational intelligence, of the older New England individualism with devoted loyalty to the purpose and meaning of objective institutions, of moral faith with the pronouncements of science. This generation finds the solution too easy; the formula of reconciliation too much a product of desire; the combination too much a mixture of incompatible factors. But Mr. Morris's personality, his spirit, was a prophecy of the possibility of a true union of substantial tradition and the free life of thought. No person ever came under his influence without attaining a greater faith in both of these things. In education he was a power among the scholars of those days who led the American College away from its provincialism into broader fields of learning, and keener methods of criticism. His old pupils and friends will rejoice that his life has found such a worthy record, that others may also come within the range of his learning and charm.

JOHN DEWEY.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

Studies in the History of Ideas. Edited by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University. New York, Columbia University Press, 1918. Volume I.—pp. 272.

The first study in this volume, by Mr. M. T. McClure, is on "Appearance and Reality in Greek Philosophy." Mr. McClure finds in Greek Philosophy three well-defined types of interest—the *scientific*, which is uppermost in the Milesians, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus; the *mystical*, which is uppermost in the Pythagoreans and Plato; and the *humanistic*, which leads to the problem of the adjustment of nature and convention, which, blending with the mystical interest, is central in Pythagoras, Plato (both in his political philosophy and his theory of knowledge), and in Aristotle. Heracleitus stands apart, "happily free from initial presuppositions and concerned with a description of the immediate." The paper concludes with a brief pragmatic criticism of absolutistic monism and the assertion that "Reality is a choice of values." The three motives of Mr. McClure are undoubtedly operative in Greek philosophy, but I cannot admit that philosophers can be classified in terms of their disjunction. Plato and Aristotle had strong scientific interests and Empedocles, for example, was not devoid of the mystical interest. Mr. McClure's criticism of absolutism is too meager to be of any value.

Mr. Walter Veazie, on "The Meaning of *Φύσις* in Early Greek Philosophy" makes an interesting collation of passages from Greek writers in support of

the view that "*φύσις* is the inner nature or essence of things, their potency, that in them which has the *power of motion in itself*."

Mr. W. T. Bush entitles his contribution "An Impression of Greek Political Philosophy." I am afraid the reader, unacquainted with Plato and Aristotle, would get from this paper an impression so hazy as scarcely to deserve the name. After a large number of citations from Greeks and moderns, Mr. Bush concludes that "the confusion and disorganization of Greek life are not likely to be exaggerated" and that this condition was a powerful motivation in the political thought of Plato. Doubtless! But Mr. Bush does not make even a slender contribution to our knowledge and understanding of Greek political thinking. His paper is not in any proper sense a study in the history of ideas.

Mr. John J. Coos, in a very slender contribution, calls attention to the fact that Francis Bacon had good ideas as to how the history of philosophy should be written.

Mr. Dewey, in "The Motivation of Hobbes's Political Philosophy" makes out a good case for the view that Hobbes aimed at giving a rational and scientific foundation to morals and politics in order to free them from all subservience to divinity. Hobbes suffered from a false psychology, but he aimed to found an art of social control on a science of a human nature. Mr. Lord's paper "The Attempt of Hobbes to Base Ethics on Psychology" takes the same general standpoint and includes some good criticism of Hobbes's theory of the springs of human conduct. Mr. Albert G. A. Balz gives a comprehensive and clear account of "The Psychology of Ideas in Hobbes" and, incidentally, contends that "the true intellectual progenitor of Hobbes is Galileo."

Mr. Roberts B. Owen has a paper on "Truth and Error in Descartes." Descartes holds that "to be true means to grasp the content of a static and determinate reality." Truth cannot change while experience may. Agreement with experience cannot be a test of truth; therefore, true ideas must copy reality; but there is no means, except clearness and distinctness, of determining whether ideas are true or not. "In order to validate such ideas the hypothesis of God is invoked." Therefore once an idea is true it is true always. Error must be due to the interference of the will. But, if this be the case, either will and intellect are not separable and ideas may be both clear and false, or intellect and will are absolutely separate and then one cannot influence the other at all. Thus error in the intellect becomes impossible. Mr. Owen makes no attempt either to trace the historical sources or the consequences of Descartes's doctrine of truth and error. Mr. Owen would have made a more instructive contribution if he had taken up the influence of scholasticism and the new mechanical theory of the universe on Descartes. The same criticism holds good, in lesser degree, of Mr. W. F. Cooley's "Spinoza's Pantheistic Argument," although here there is some reference to the Neo-Platonic Infinite and the scholastic *Ens Realissimum*. The influence of mathematics on Spinoza's thinking is not noticed.

Mr. Woodbridge, in his paper on "Berkeley's Realism," argues against the view that Berkeley was much influenced by Locke and for the view that Berkeley's chief motive was to defend "the realism of the common man reinforced by the nominalism of the philosopher"; "by refining the naive realism of the common man, the opposition between materialists and spiritualists is reduced to an absurdity." The thesis of the paper is well documented and argued. Nevertheless, I feel that, while Mr. Woodbridge's contention is largely correct, Berkeley's strongest motive after all was to furnish a plain and simple argument for God and immortality and that he was, above everything else, a theologically-minded philosopher. In the *Principles of Human Knowledge* and elsewhere he waxes enthusiastic over the irrefragable basis of religion that his philosophy affords.

Mr. A. L. Jones has "A Note on Thomas Brown's Contribution to Esthetics," a theory which he estimates highly.

Mr. Montague's discussion of "The Antinomy and its Implications for Logical Theory" is interesting and good. His criticisms of Ultra-Rationalism and Ultra-Empiricism are excellent. I do not feel that he does full justice to the relational view, which seems to me to be capable of being so stated as to include his own "Double Aspect View." But this paper, good in itself, is not at all a contribution to the *history of ideas*. The last paper, by Mr. H. T. Costello, on "Old Problems with New Faces in Recent Logic," contains a refreshing appreciation of Aristotle as an instrumentalist in logic and a just valuation of the biological-nominalist and mechanist-realist points of view in logic. By the latter he means the view that "nature is subject to precise laws." This standpoint, as he says, does not mean that everything in the world can be accounted for in terms of mechanics, physics and chemistry. He concludes with a convincing argument against the assumption, common to B. Russell and others, that the 'logical atomism' which would reduce reality to an aggregate of terms and relations wholly external to one another is a necessary consequence of the doctrine that both physical reality and conscious being, including thought itself, have determinate structures and modes of behavior which it is the business of the mind to find and not to make out of whole cloth. Both thinking and reality which is not thinking are systematic. There are many systems in the world, one supervening upon another. To all of this I heartily subscribe. The whole paper expounds a sound standpoint, but it is only in the vaguest sense historical.

In short, this volume, taken in its entirety, is misnamed. Contributions to the history of philosophy should be of two kinds—(1) Some or all of the leading ideas of a philosopher should be expounded, with abundant reference to his writings. The sources of these ideas, whether in previous thinkers or in the author's contemporaries or his other interests, intellectual or practical, should be followed out. The curve of his historical influence might well be plotted too. (2) Another fruitful historical method, of whose use in an elementary fashion and on a large scale Windelband's *History of Philosophy* is the best example, would be to trace the development of a leading idea through

a whole period or succession of periods; for example, the idea of nature, substance, law, right, cause, end, self, etc.; and to show the historical antecedents and consequences of the idea in question. Some of the papers in the present volume, notably those of Messrs. Dewey and Woodbridge, do conform to the first method. Others, such as that of Mr. McClure, attempt, with but meager results, the second method. Some are not historical in any proper sense of the term.

J. A. LEIGHTON.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY.

The Field of Philosophy. An Outline of Lectures on Introduction to Philosophy.

By JOSEPH ALEXANDER LEIGHTON. Columbus, Ohio, R. G. Adams & Co., 1918.—pp. xii, 414.

The author believes that a student's first course in philosophy should combine the historical and systematic methods of approach. He accordingly begins with a rapid survey of the most significant stages and types of philosophical thinking, starting with the primitive world view and including the early Greek philosophy, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Democritus, Stoicism, Neo-Platonism, and Christian philosophy in ancient and medieval forms. The principal problems are thus in the first place presented in a manner that is both elementary and representative of their actual course of development in human thought. The problems which are then discussed in a more advanced way, from the modern standpoint, include that of substance (materialism, spiritualism, double aspect theory), the one and the many, evolution and teleology, and the self. An outline of the fundamental concepts of metaphysics (substance, causality, finality, individuality, space, time) and two chapters on the theory of knowledge follow. The closing three chapters treat of the various branches of philosophy in their relations to one another, the status of values, and the philosophy of history. The general standpoint of the book is idealistic. An appendix, however, gives accounts of the new realism, pragmatism, and of the philosophy of Bergson.

The principles on which the book is planned are excellent. First, the choice of topics is admirable. The topics treated are the very ones which, in the experience of the reviewer at least, undergraduates in their first course most wish to know something about. Secondly, the arrangement of material is pedagogically sound. The historical survey orients the student in the problems, and when he meets them for the second time in the latter half of the book he is ready to attack them with renewed interest and profit. Thirdly, the order of topics is rational. Each is made to lead to that which follows. The problem of knowledge is reserved until toward the last, the place where historically and pedagogically it belongs.

Mechanically, the book is in the main to be commended. Type and binding are attractive. The references at the end of each chapter are well chosen. The names of authors ought always to have been given in full (to save time fumbling over cards in library catalogues). The student should be told by