The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics

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The Change to Change

Modernization, Development, and Politics

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I. Political Science and Political Change
Change is a problem for social science. Sociologists, for instance, have regularly bemoaned their lack of knowledge concerning social change. In 1951 Talcott Parsons flatly stated, in italics, that "a general theory of the processes of change in social systems is not possible in the present state of knowledge." Thirteen years later Don Martindale could see little improvement. Sociology, he argued, could account for structure but not for change: "its theory of social change," said he, also in italics (!), "is the weakest branch of sociological theory." Other sociologists have expressed similar views.1 Yet, as opposed to political scientists, the sociologists are relatively well off. Compared with past neglect of the theory of political change in political science, sociology is rich with works on the theory of social change. These more generalized treatments are supplemented by the extensive literature on group dynamics, planned change, organizational change, and the nature of innovation. Until very recently, in contrast, political theory in general has not attempted to deal directly with the problems of change. "Over the last seventy-five years," David Easton wrote in 1953, "political research has confined itself largely to the study of given conditions to the neglect of political change."2

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Why did this happen? Several factors would seem to play a role. While the roots of political science go back to Aristotle (whose central concern was "to consider things in the process of their growth"), modern political science is a product of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It came into being in the stable political systems of Western Europe and North America, where radical change could be viewed as a temporary deviation in, or extraordinary malfunctioning of, the political system. In Parson's terminology, political scientists might study change in a system (such as the fluctuations in power of political parties or of Congress and president), but they did not concern themselves with change of the system. Political scientists neglected change because they focused their primary attention on states where change did not seem to be much of a problem.

Reinforcing this tendency was the antihistorical temper of the more avant garde movements in political science. Born of history out of law, political science could establish itself as a discipline only by establishing its independence from its parents. Consequently, political scientists de-emphasized their ties with history and emphasized the similarities between their discipline and other social sciences. Political science evolved with the aid of periodic infusions of ideas, concepts, and methods from psychology (Harold Lasswell in the 1930s), social psychology (David Truman and the group approach of the late 1940s), sociology (structural-functionalism of the 1950s), and economics (equilibrium, input-output, game theory, in the 1960s). The behavioral stress on survey data, interviewing, and participant-observation reinforced the rejection of history.

Political scientists attempt to explain political phenomena. They view politics as a dependent variable, and they naturally look for the explanations of politics in other social processes and institutions. This tendency was reinforced by the Marxian and Freudian intellectual atmosphere of the 1930s and 1940s. Political scientists were themselves concerned with the social, psychological, and economic roots of political behavior. Consequently, social change, personality change, and economic change were, in their view, more fundamental than political change. If one could understand and explain the former, one could easily account for the latter.

Finally, political change tended to be ignored because comparative politics tended to be ignored. With rare exceptions, such as the work of Carl Friedrich and a few others, political scientists did not attempt systematic comparative analyses of similar processes or functions in different political systems or general comparisons of political systems as systems. In book titles and course titles, comparative government meant foreign

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3 Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, 1951), pp. 480 ff.
government. The study of political change is, however, intimately linked to the study of comparative politics. The study of change involves the comparison of similarities and differences through time; comparative politics involves the analysis of similarities and differences through space. In addition, the comparison of two political systems which exist simultaneously but which differ significantly in their major characteristics inevitably raises the questions: Is one system likely to evolve into a pattern similar to that of the other? Are the two systems related to each other in an evolutionary sense? Thus, the analysis of political change is not likely to progress unless the study of comparative politics is also booming.

Not until the mid-1950s did a renaissance in the study of comparative politics get under way. That renaissance began with a concern with modernization and the comparison of modern and traditional political systems. It evolved in the early 1960s into a preoccupation with the concept of political development, approached by way of systems theory, statistical analysis, and comparative history. In the late 1960s, the focus on political development in turn yielded to broader efforts to generate more general theories of political change.

II. The Context of Modernization

General theory of modernization The new developments in comparative politics in the 1950s involved extension of the geographical scope of concern from Western Europe and related areas to the non-Western "developing" countries. It was no longer true that political scientists ignored change. Indeed, they seemed almost overwhelmed with the immensity of the changes taking place in the modernizing societies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The theory of modernization was embraced by political scientists, and comparative politics was looked at in the context of modernization. The concepts of modernity and tradition bid fair to replace many of the other typologies which had been dear to the hearts of political analysts: democracy, oligarchy, and dictatorship; liberalism and conservatism; totalitarianism and constitutionalism; socialism, communism, and capitalism; nationalism and internationalism. Obviously, these categories were still used. But by the late 1960s, for every discussion among political scientists in which the categories "constitutional" and "totalitarian" were employed, there must have been ten others in which the categories "modern" and "traditional" were used.

These categories were, of course, the latest manifestation of a Great Dichotomy between more primitive and more advanced societies which has been a common feature of Western social thought for the past one hundred years. Their post-World War II incarnation dates from the elab-
oration by Parsons and Edward Shils of their pattern variables in the early 1950s and the subsequent extension of these from "choices" confronting an "actor" to characteristics of social systems undertaken by Frank Sutton in his 1955 paper on "Social Theory and Comparative Politics." Sutton's summary of modern and traditional societies (or, in his terms, "industrial" and "agricultural" societies) encompasses most of the generally accepted distinguishing characteristics of these two types:

**Agricultural Society**
1. Predominance of ascriptive, particularistic, diffuse patterns
2. Stable local groups and limited spatial mobility
3. Relatively simple and stable "occupational" differentiation
4. A "deferential" stratification system of diffuse impact

**Modern Industrial Society**
1. Predominance of universalistic, specific, and achievement norms
2. High degree of social mobility (in a general—not necessarily "vertical"—sense)
3. Well-developed occupational system, insulated from other social structures
4. "Egalitarian" class system based on generalized patterns of occupational achievement
5. Prevalence of "associations," i.e., functionally specific, nonascriptive structures

The essential difference between modern and traditional society, most theorists of modernization contend, lies in the greater control which modern man has over his natural and social environment. This control, in turn, is based on the expansion of scientific and technological knowledge. To a sociologist such as Marion Levy, for instance, a society is "more or less modernized to the extent that its members use inanimate sources of power and/or use tools to multiply the effects of their efforts." Cyril Black, an historian, argues that modern society results from adaptation of "historically evolved institutions . . . to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man’s knowledge, permitting control over his environment, that accompanied the scientific revolution." Among political scientists, Dankwart A. Rustow holds that modernization involves a "rapidly widening control over nature through closer cooperation among men." To virtually all theorists, these dif-

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ferences in the extent of man's control over his environment reflect differences in his fundamental attitudes toward and expectations from his environment. The contrast between modern man and traditional man is the source of the contrast between modern society and traditional society. Traditional man is passive and acquiescent; he expects continuity in nature and society and does not believe in the capacity of man to change or to control either. Modern man, in contrast, believes in both the possibility and the desirability of change, and has confidence in the ability of man to control change so as to accomplish his purposes.

At the intellectual level, modern society is characterized by the tremendous accumulation of knowledge about man's environment and by the diffusion of this knowledge through society by means of literacy, mass communications, and education. In contrast to traditional society, modern society also involves much better health, longer life expectancy, and higher rates of occupational and geographical mobility. It is predominantly urban rather than rural. Socially, the family and other primary groups having diffuse roles are supplanted or supplemented in modern society by consciously organized secondary associations having more specific functions. Economically, there is a diversification of activity as a few simple occupations give way to many complex ones; the level of occupational skill and the ratio of capital to labor are much higher than in traditional society. Agriculture declines in importance compared to commercial, industrial, and other nonagricultural activities, and commercial agriculture replaces subsistence agriculture. The geographical scope of economic activity is far greater in modern society than in traditional society, and there is a centralization of such activity at the national level, with the emergence of a national market, national sources of capital, and other national economic institutions.

The differences between a modern polity and a traditional one flow from these more general characteristics of modern and traditional societies. Political scientists have attempted various formulations of these differences. Perhaps the most succinct yet complete checklist is that furnished by Robert E. Ward and Rustow. A modern polity, they argue, has the following characteristics which a traditional polity presumably lacks:

1. A highly differentiated and functionally specific system of governmental organization;
2. A high degree of integration within this governmental structure;
3. The prevalence of rational and secular procedures for the making of political decisions;

4. The large volume, wide range, and high efficacy of its political and administrative decisions;
5. A widespread and effective sense of popular identification with the history, territory, and national identity of the state;
6. Widespread popular interest and involvement in the political system, though not necessarily in the decision-making aspects thereof;
7. The allocation of political roles by achievement rather than ascription; and
8. Judicial and regulatory techniques based upon a predominantly secular and impersonal system of law.

More generally, a modern polity, in contrast to a traditional polity, is characterized by rationalized authority, differentiated structure, mass participation, and a consequent capability to accomplish a broad range of goals.9

The bridge across the Great Dichotomy between modern and traditional societies is the Grand Process of Modernization. The broad outlines and characteristics of this process are also generally agreed upon by scholars. Most writers on modernization implicitly or explicitly assign nine characteristics to the modernization process.

1. Modernization is a revolutionary process. This follows directly from the contrasts between modern and traditional society. The one differs fundamentally from the other, and the change from tradition to modernity consequently involves a radical and total change in patterns of human life. The shift from tradition to modernity, as Cyril Black says, is comparable to the changes from prehuman to human existence and from primitive to civilized societies. The changes in the eighteenth century, Reinhard Bendix echoes, were “comparable in magnitude only to the transformation of nomadic peoples into settled agriculturalists some 10,000 years earlier.”10

2. Modernization is a complex process. It cannot be easily reduced to a single factor or to a single dimension. It involves changes in virtually all areas of human thought and behavior. At a minimum, its components include: industrialization, urbanization, social mobilization, differentiation, secularization, media expansion, increasing literacy and education, expansion of political participation.

3. Modernization is a systemic process. Changes in one factor are related to and affect changes in the other factors. Modernization, as Daniel Lerner has expressed it in an oft-quoted phrase, is “a process

with some distinctive quality of its own, which would explain why modernity is felt as a consistent whole among people who live by its rules.” The various elements of modernization have been highly associated together “because, in some historic sense, they had to go together.”

4. Modernization is a global process. Modernization originated in fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe, but it has now become a worldwide phenomenon. This is brought about primarily through the diffusion of modern ideas and techniques from the European center, but also in part through the endogenous development of non-Western societies. In any event, all societies were at one time traditional; all societies are now either modern or in the process of becoming modern.

5. Modernization is a lengthy process. The totality of the changes which modernization involves can only be worked out through time. Consequently, while modernization is revolutionary in the extent of the changes it brings about in traditional society, it is evolutionary in the amount of time required to bring about those changes. Western societies required several centuries to modernize. The contemporary modernizing societies will do it in less time. Rates of modernization are, in this sense, accelerating, but the time required to move from tradition to modernity will still be measured in generations.

6. Modernization is a phased process. It is possible to distinguish different levels or phases of modernization through which all societies will move. Societies obviously begin in the traditional stage and end in the modern stage. The intervening transitional phase, however, can also be broken down into subphases. Societies consequently can be compared and ranked in terms of the extent to which they have moved down the road from tradition to modernity. While the leadership in the process and the more detailed patterns of modernization will differ from one society to another, all societies will move through essentially the same stages.

7. Modernization is a homogenizing process. Many different types of traditional societies exist; indeed, traditional societies, some argue, have little in common except their lack of modernity. Modern societies, on the other hand, share basic similarities. Modernization produces tendencies toward convergence among societies. Modernization involves movement “toward an interdependence among politically organized societies and toward an ultimate integration of societies.” The “universal imperatives of modern ideas and institutions” may lead to a stage “at which the various societies are so homogeneous as to be capable of forming a world state. . . .”

12 Black, Dynamics of Modernization, pp. 155, 174.
8. Modernization is an *irreversible* process. While there may be temporary breakdowns and occasional reversals in elements of the modernizing process, modernization as a whole is an essentially secular trend. A society which has reached certain levels of urbanization, literacy, industrialization in one decade will not decline to substantially lower levels in the next decade. The rates of change will vary significantly from one society to another, but the direction of change will not.

9. Modernization is a *progressive* process. The traumas of modernization are many and profound, but in the long run modernization is not only inevitable, it is also desirable. The costs and the pains of the period of transition, particularly its early phases, are great, but the achievement of a modern social, political, and economic order is worth them. Modernization in the long run enhances human well-being, culturally and materially.

**Modernization in intellectual history** This theory of modernization, as it emerged in the 1950s, contrasted sharply with the theories of historical evolution and social change which prevailed in Western thought during the 1920s and 1930s. The social theory of these decades was overwhelmingly pessimistic in its view of the future of man and society. Two schools of pessimism can be distinguished. One, typified by writers such as Oswald Spengler, Vilfredo Pareto, Pitirim Sorokin, and Arnold Toynbee, focused on the patterns of evolution of particular civilizations or cultures. They attempted to generalize sequences of the origins, growth, maturity, and decline of these great human societies. Theirs were, in essence, cyclical theories of history. The lesson applied to contemporary Western civilization was that it was at, or had passed, its zenith and that it was beginning the process of degeneration. The other strand of pessimism focused more exclusively on Western society. Its proponents tended to argue that Western society had earlier been integrated and conducive to human self-fulfillment. At some point in the past, however, a fundamental change had set in and Western history had begun a downward course. The breakup of human community, the attenuation of religious values, the drift into alienation and anomie, the terrifying emergence of a mass society: these were the products of secularization, industrialization, urbanization, and democratization. The processes which the 1950s viewed benevolently as modernization, the 1930s viewed with alarm as disintegration. Some authors dated the fall from grace with the Reformation; others, with the Renaissance, the industrial revolution, or the French Revolution. At some point, however, Western history went off the track, and a special process started. It began with the rejection of religion and the breakup of community and led consistently and irreversibly down the steep hill to mass politics, world wars, the purge trials, and Dachau. In some versions of this essentially conservative
Weltanschauung, modern liberalism became only a “soft” version of the fundamental misconceptions which underlay communism and fascism. “In almost every instance,” as Reinhold Niebuhr said, “the communist evil is rooted in miscalculations which are shared by modern liberal culture. . . .” “If you will not have God (and He is a jealous God),” agreed T. S. Eliot, “you should pay your respects to Hitler or Stalin.”

Other thinkers stressed the decline of religion less and the disintegrative effects of industrialization and democratization more. Some, like Karl Mannheim and Hannah Arendt, warned of the totalitarian tendencies toward mass society. Those who were reluctant to trace the downward turn of the West back to the sixteenth or even the eighteenth century saw World War I as the turning point. At about that time, Lasswell argued, the trend of history was reversed “from progress toward a world commonwealth of free men, toward a world order in which the garrison-prison state reintroduces caste-bound social systems.” In similar vein, Walter Lippmann started in 1938 to develop his argument that 1917 was the truly revolutionary year in which governments began to crack under the strains of war and upheaval and Western society began moving toward paralysis, chaos, and totalitarianism. The secular pessimism of the interwar years reflected the perceived catastrophes and chaos of Western society brought about by the processes of industrialization, urbanization, and the like. The modernizing optimism of the 1950s and 1960s reflected the perceived social, economic, and political successes of Western society brought on by those same processes.

The modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s thus contrasts starkly with the secular pessimism of the 1920s and 1930s. Its most striking resemblance is, instead, to the evolutionary optimism of a half century earlier. The social theory of the late twentieth century more closely resembles that of the late nineteenth century than it does that of the early twentieth century. Victorian styles of thought, like Victorian styles in furniture, suddenly acquired a new respectability in the late 1950s. The Great Dichotomy of tradition and modernity had itself, of course, received its most influential original formulations in Sir Henry Maine’s 1861 distinctions between status and contract, in Ferdinand Tonnies’ contrast between gemeinschaft and gesellschaft in 1887, and in Max


Weber's discussion of traditional and rational sources of authority. Similarly, many of the characteristics and consequences which the post-World War II theorists ascribed to the Grand Process of Modernization will be found in the writings of nineteenth-century writers such as Herbert Spencer and Karl Marx. In both cases, human society is seen as moving in response to essentially economic causes through an identifiable sequence of ever more beneficent phases.

The nineteenth-century theories of progress were discredited by world wars, economic collapse, political chaos, and totalitarianism in the first part of the twentieth century. Neither Social Darwinism nor Marxism provided an accurate key to the future. The question remains whether twentieth century theories of progress will be any more successful. Twentieth century social scientists have been as confident of modernization in the Third World as nineteenth century Marxists were of revolution in the First World. The latter were predicting the future by the extension of the past; the former are predicting the future by the transfer of the past. The failure of the one suggests caution as to the possibilities for success of the other.

The optimism of the Social Darwinists and Marxists of the late nineteenth century was rooted in the contemplation of the progress which Western society was making at that time and consequently looked forward to the future bliss of Spencer's industrial society or Marx's socialist commonwealth. It was an optimism of future progress. The optimism of the twentieth century theorists of modernization, on the other hand, is essentially an optimism of retroactive progress. Satisfaction about the present leads to an optimism about the past and about its relevance to other societies. The modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s had little or nothing to say about the future of modern societies; the advanced countries of the West, it was assumed, had "arrived"; their past was of interest not for what it would show about their future but for what it showed about the future of those other societies which still struggled through the transition between tradition and modernity. The extraordinary acceptance of modernization theory in both Western and non-Western societies in the 1950s derived in part from the fact that it justified complacency in one and hope in the other. The theory of modernization thus rationalized change abroad and the status quo at home. It left blank the future of modernity. Modernization theory combined an

extraordinary faith in the efficacy of modernity’s past with no image of the potentialities of modernity’s future.\(^\text{17}\)

**Modernization revisionism** Modernization theory, like any social theory, thus suffered from a limited perspective deriving from its particular temporal and social origins. In addition, however, there were some logical and inherent weaknesses in the theory itself. In the later 1960s a small-scale corrective reaction set in which tended to pinpoint some of the difficulties of mainstream modernization theory. Among the theorists associated with modernization revisionism were Joseph Gusfield, Milton Singer, Reinhard Bendix, Lloyd and Suzanne Rudolph, S. N. Eisenstadt, and F. C. Heesterman.\(^\text{18}\) Perhaps significantly, the empirical work of many of these scholars focused on India, the twentieth century’s most complex traditional society. The criticisms which these analysts made of the traditional theory of modernization focused on: (a) the meaning and usefulness of the concepts of modernity and tradition; (b) the relationship between modernity and tradition; and (c) the ambiguities in the concept of modernization itself.

In the first place, as many modernization theorists themselves pointed out, modernity and tradition are essentially asymmetrical concepts. The

\(^{17}\) The late 1960s saw the emergence of “postmodern” theorizing, the leading scholars of which, however, had not been primarily involved in the analysis of the transition from tradition to modernity. These theories arose out of concern with the impact of technology on modern rather than traditional society. See Daniel Bell, “Notes on the Post-Industrial Society,” *The Public Interest*, VI (Winter 1967), 24–35, and VII (Spring 1967), 102–18, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages: America’s Role in the Technetronic Era* (New York, 1970). Both Brzezinski and Bell would probably assign many of the nine characteristics of modernization mentioned above to the transition from modernity to what follows. Both stand generally in the optimistic stream and in that sense share more with the modernization theorists than they do with the early twentieth century pessimists. More than the modernization theorists, however, both have been criticized by other writers who view with alarm the prospect of a postindustrial or technetronic society. Political scientists have yet to probe very deeply the political implications of this new historical transition.

modern ideal is set forth, and then everything which is not modern is labeled traditional. Modernity, as Rustow said, "can be affirmatively defined," while "tradition remains largely a residual concept."\(^{19}\) Dichotomies which combine "positive" concepts and residual ones, however, are highly dangerous analytically. In point of fact, they are not properly dichotomies at all. They encourage the tendency to assume that the residual concept has all the coherence and precision of the positively defined concept. They obfuscate the diversity which may exist in the residual phenomenon and the fact that the differences between one manifestation of the residual concept and another manifestation of the same concept may be as great as or greater than the differences between either of the residual manifestations and the more precisely defined other pole of the polarity. This is a problem common to many dichotomies; the concept "civil-military relations," for instance, suffers from a similar disability and one which has had a serious impact upon the understanding of the relationship between the military and the multifarious nonmilitary groups in society, whose differences among themselves often exceed their differences from the military.\(^{20}\) Tradition is likewise simply too heterogeneous to be of much use as an analytical concept. The characteristics which are ascribed to traditional societies are the opposites of those ascribed to modern societies. Given the variety among nonmodern societies, however, obviously the "fit" of any particular society to the traditional ideal type will be haphazard and inexact at best. Pigmy tribes, Tokugawa Japan, medieval Europe, the Hindu village are all traditional. Aside from that label, however, it is difficult to see what else they have in common. Traditional societies are diverse in values and heterogeneous in structures.\(^{21}\) In addition, the concept of a tradition as essentially changeless came under attack. Traditional societies, it was argued, are not static. "The view that tradition and innovation are necessarily in conflict has begun to seem overly abstract and unreal."\(^{22}\)

The concept of modernity also suffers some ambiguities. These stem from the tendency to identify modernity with virtue. All good things are modern, and modernity consequently becomes a mélange of incompatible virtues. In particular, there is a failure to distinguish between what is modern and what is Western. The one thing which modernization

\(^{19}\) Rustow, *World of Nations*, p. 12.


theory has not produced is a model of Western society—meaning late twentieth century Western European and North American society—which could be compared with, or even contrasted with, the model of modern society. Implicitly, the two are assumed to be virtually identical. Modern society has been Western society writ abstractly and polysyllabically. But to a nonmodern, non-Western society, the processes of modernization and Westernization may appear to be very different indeed. This difficulty has been glossed over because the modern, non-Western box in the four-way breakdown of modern-nonmodern and Western-non-Western societies has, at least until the present, been empty. Presumably, however, Japan is either in or about to enter that box, and it is consequently not surprising that a Japanese scholar should take the lead in raising squarely the issue of how much of modernity is Western and how much of Western society is modern. How do two modern societies, one of which is non-Western, resemble each other as compared to two Western societies, one of which is nonmodern? (It should also be noted that non-Western is, like nonmodern, a residual concept: the differences between two non-Western societies may well be greater than the differences between any one non-Western society and a Western society.)

Other questions have developed about the relations between tradition and modernity. The simpler theories of modernization implied a zero-sum relation between the two: the rise of modernity in society was accompanied by the fading of tradition. In many ways, however, modernity supplements but does not supplant tradition. Modern practices, beliefs, institutions are simply added to traditional ones. It is false to believe that tradition and modernity "are mutually exclusive." Modern society is not simply modern; it is modern and traditional. The attitudes and behavior patterns may in some cases be fused; in others, they may comfortably coexist, one alongside the other, despite the apparent incongruity of it all. In addition, one can go further and argue not only that coexistence is possible but that modernization itself may strengthen tradition. It may give new life to important elements of the preexisting culture, such as religion. "Modern developments," as Heesterman has said, "more often than not go to strengthen tradition and give it a new dimension. To take a well-known example: modern means of mass communications, such as radio and film, give an unprecedented spread to traditional culture (broadcasting of Sanskrit mantras or of classical Indian music, films on mythological and devotional themes)." Tribal and other ascriptive


"traditional" identities may be invigorated in a way which would never have happened in "traditional" society. Conversely, traditional attitudes and behavior may also help modernization: the extended family may become the entrepreneurial unit responsible for economic growth; the caste may be the group facilitating the operation of political democracy. "Traditional symbols and leadership forms can be vital parts of the value bases supporting modernizing frameworks."

For all the ambiguities involved in the concepts of modernity and tradition, their rough outlines nonetheless appear possessed of comparative conceptual clarity when compared with the fuzziness which goes with the concept of modernization. In general, the writings on modernization were much more successful in delineating the characteristics of modern and traditional societies than they were in depicting the process by which movement occurs from one state to the other. They focused more on the direction of change, from "this" to "that," than on the scope, timing, methods, and rate of change. For this reason, they were more theories of "comparative statics" than they were theories of change. The dichotomic developmental theories, moreover, were often ambiguous as to whether the phases which they posited were actual stages in historical evolution or whether they were Weberian ideal-types. As ideal-types, they were abstract models which could be used to analyze societies at any point in time. As historical concepts, however, the traditional category was presumably losing relevance and the modern category was gaining it. Inevitably, also, the dual character of the concepts undermined the conceptual dichotomy. Obviously all actual societies combine elements of both the traditional and modern ideal-types. Consequently, all actual societies are transitional or mixed. Viewed in terms of static ideal-types, this analysis presented no problems. One could still use the traditional and modern models to identify and relate the traditional and modern characteristics of any particular society. Viewed as a theory of history or change, however, the addition of a transitional category tended to exclude the traditional and modern stages from the historical process. Traditional society (like the state of nature) could only have existed as a hypothetical starting point in the distant past. A truly modern society would only exist if and when traditional remnants disappear in the distant future. Traditionalism and modernity thus cease to be stages in the historical process and become the beginning and


ending points of history. But if all real societies are transitional societies, a theory is needed which will explain the forms and processes of change at work in transitional societies. This is just what the dichotomic theory failed to provide.

Beyond this, each of the assumptions which underlay the original, simple image of modernization could also be called into question. Contrary to the view that modernization is revolutionary, it could be argued that the differences between traditional and modern societies are really not that great. Not only do modern societies incorporate many traditional elements, but traditional societies often have many universalistic, achievement oriented, bureaucratic characteristics which are normally thought of as modern.27 The cultural, psychological, and behavioral continuities existing within a society through both its traditional and modern phases may be significantly greater than the dissimilarities between these phases. Similarly, the claim that modernization is a complex process could be challenged by the argument that modernization involves fundamental changes in only one dimension and that changes in other dimensions are only consequences of changes in that fundamental dimension. This was, of course, Marx’s argument.

Contrary to Lerner’s view of the systemic qualities of modernization, it can be argued that the various elements of the modernization process are historically discrete and that, while they have their roots in common causes, progress along one dimension has no necessary relationship to progress along another. Such a view is, indeed, implied by rejection of the mutually exclusive nature of modernity and tradition. If these concepts, moreover, are thought of simply as ideal types, and “If we are to avoid mistaking ideal types for accurate descriptions, we must take care to treat the clusters of attributes as hypothetically, not as actually, correlated.” In addition, as Bendix went on to argue, a distinction ought to be maintained between modernization and modernity. “Many attributes of modernization, like widespread literacy or modern medicine, have appeared, or have been adopted, in isolation from other attributes of a modern society. Hence, modernization in some sphere of life may occur without resulting in ‘modern.’ ”28 By extension, this argument also challenges the assumption that modernization is a global process. Modernization may be simply a peculiarity of Western culture; whatever changes are taking place in African and Asian cultures could be of a fundamentally different character and have very different results from those changes which occurred in Western societies.


The early assumptions about the timing and duration of modernization were also brought under criticism. The latecomers, it could be argued, can modernize rapidly through revolutionary means and by borrowing the experience and technology of the early modernizers. The entire process can thus be telescoped, and the assumption that there is a well-defined progression of phases—preconditions, takeoff, drive to maturity, and the like—through which all societies must move is likely to be invalid. Contrary to the common idea that modernization produces homogenization or convergence, it could be said that it may reinforce the distinctive characteristics of each society and thus broaden the differences between societies rather than narrow them. To the contrary of the idea that modernization is irreversible, it could be argued that it is a cyclical process with major ups and downs over time or that a turning point in the process will eventually be reached where the “upward” secular trend of modernization will be replaced by a sustained “downward” trend of disintegration or primitization. Finally, contrary to the view that modernization is a progressive process, it may be argued, as earlier twentieth century thinkers asserted, that modernization destroys the more intimate communities in which alone man can realize his full personality; it sacrifices human, personal, and spiritual values to achieve mass production and mass society. This type of argument against change was very popular at times in the past. The relative absence of such a traditional, romantic opposition to modernization among theorists in modern societies and politicians in modernizing societies was some evidence of the extent to which the fever of modernization gripped the intellectually and politically conscious world of the 1950s. Nonetheless, by the late 1960s some opposition to and criticism of modernization along these lines were beginning to appear among intellectuals in many developing societies.

III. The Concept of Political Development

Definitions of the concept Sharing the concern of other social scientists with the Great Dichotomy of modernity and tradition and the Grand Process of Modernization, political scientists in the 1960s began to pursue more actively their interests in what was variously called political modernization or political development. Their starting point was the concepts of tradition and modernity; eventually this essentially comparative and static focus gave way to a more dynamic and developmentally oriented set of concerns. This shift can be clearly seen in the work of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) Committee on Comparative Politics and particularly of Gabriel Almond, its chairman and intellectual leader during the 1950s and early 1960s. The volume which undoubtedly played the major role in first focusing
the attention of political scientists on developmental problems was *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, edited by Almond and James S. Coleman and published in 1960 under the sponsorship of the Comparative Politics Committee and the Princeton Center for International Studies. The bulk of the book consisted of descriptions and analyses in terms of a common format of politics in five developing areas. The principal intellectual impact of the book, however, came from the introduction by Almond and, to a lesser degree, the conclusion by Coleman. This impact was very largely the result of their application to the politics of non-Western countries of a general concept of the political system. Almond used this framework to distinguish between "developed" and "underdeveloped" or "developing" political systems. Developed political systems are characteristic of modern societies and underdeveloped ones of traditional societies. Almond's concepts of "traditionality" and of "modernity" or, as he seemed to prefer, "rationality," are described in Parsonsian terms derived from the central stream of sociological analysis. Almond's distinctive contribution in this respect, however, was the insistence that all political systems are culturally mixed, combining elements of modernity and tradition. "All political systems—the developed Western ones as well as the less-developed non-Western ones—are transitional systems. . . ." He was appropriately critical of some sociological theorists for promoting "an unfortunate theoretical polarization" in not recognizing this "dualistic" quality of political systems.

*The Politics of the Developing Areas* is a work in comparative politics, not one in political development. This volume presents a behavioral and systems approach for the analysis of comparative politics; it does not present a concept or theory of political development. The phrase "political development" is, indeed, notably absent from its vocabulary. It is concerned with the analysis of the political systems of societies which are presumed to be developing (or modernizing) and the comparison of those systems with the political systems presumed to exist in modern societies. Its key categories are system, role, culture, structure, function, socialization. With the possible exception of socialization, no one of these refers to a dynamic process. They are categories essential to the comparative analysis of political systems; they are not oriented to the change and development of political systems. Almond posited a number of functions which must be performed in any political system and then compared systems in terms of the structures which perform those functions. "What we have done," he said, "is to separate political function from political structure." Almond also argued that, "We need dualistic models rather

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than monistic ones, and developmental as well as equilibrium models if we are to understand differences precisely and grapple effectively with the processes of political change. In this book, Almond and his associates presented the elements of a dualistic model of the political system, but they did not attempt to present a "developmental model" which would contribute to the understanding of "the processes of political change."

For Almond that task came six years later with another major theoretical work coauthored with C. Bingham Powell, Jr. Unlike the earlier volume, this book was concerned with political dynamics and focused explicitly on political development as a subject and as a concept. Almond recognized the limitations of his earlier work in relation to the problems of political change. That earlier framework, he said, "was suitable mainly for the analysis of political systems in a given cross section of time. It did not permit us to explore developmental patterns, to explain how political systems change and why they change." The earlier set of political functions (now called "conversion functions") was now supplemented by categories which described more fully the demands and supports which operate on the "input" side of the political system and by categories which described the "output" capabilities of the political system in relation to its environments (extractive, regulative, distributive, symbolic, and responsive).

Political development, Almond and Powell argued, is the response of the political system to changes in its societal or international environments and, in particular, the response of the system to the challenges of state building, nation building, participation, and distribution. Political development itself was thought of primarily in terms of political modernization. The three criteria of political development were held to be: structural differentiation, subsystem autonomy, and cultural secularization. Almond thus came face to face with the problem which was gripping many other political scientists at that time: What is political development?

The answers to this question were more numerous than the answerers. Almost every scholar or group of scholars concerned with the politics of the developing areas had to come up with at least one formulation. Even to attempt to itemize them all here would be a tiresome and not particularly useful task. Fortunately, however, in 1965 Lucian W. Pye compiled a fairly comprehensive listing of ten meanings which had been attributed to the concept of political development:

30 Ibid., p. 25.
1. the political prerequisite of economic development;
2. the politics typical of industrial societies;
3. political modernization;
4. the operation of a nation-state;
5. administrative and legal development;
6. mass mobilization and participation;
7. the building of democracy;
8. stability and orderly change;
9. mobilization and power;
10. one aspect of a multidimensional process of social change.

In a noble effort at synthesis, Pye attempted to summarize the most prevalent common themes on political development as involving movement toward: increasing equality among individuals in relation to the political system; increasing capacity of the political system in relation to its environments; and increasing differentiation of institutions and structures within the political system. These three dimensions, he argued, are to be found “lying at the heart of the development process.”32 In a similar vein, another effort to generalize about definitions of political development found four oft-recurring concepts: rationalization, national integration, democratization, and mobilization or participation.33

This “quest for political development,” in John Montgomery’s phrase,34 necessarily led political scientists to grapple with three more general issues. First, what was the relationship between political development and political modernization? The tendency was to think of political development as virtually identical with political modernization. Political development was one element of the modernization syndrome. Political scientists might disagree as to what types of change constituted political development, but whatever they did choose was almost invariably thought of as a part of the more general process of modernization. The principal dissent from this point of view came in 1965 from Samuel P. Huntington, who argued that it was highly desirable to distinguish between political development and modernization. The identification of the two, he said, limited too drastically the applicability of the concept of political development “in both time and space.” It became restricted to a particular phase of historical evolution, and hence it was impossible to talk about the “political development” of the Greek city-state or of the Roman Empire. In addition, political development as political modernization made the former a rather confusing complex concept, tended to reduce

its empirical relevance, and made it difficult if not impossible to conceive of its reversibility, i.e., to talk about political decay.\textsuperscript{35}

A second issue which political scientists had to deal with in their definitional efforts was whether political development was a unitary or a complex concept. Since so many people had so many ideas as to what constituted political development, the prevalent tendency was to think of it as a complex concept. This tendency was explained or, perhaps, rationalized by Pye on the grounds that the “multi-function character of politics . . . means that no single scale can be used for measuring the degree of political development.”\textsuperscript{36} Hence, most scholars used several dimensions: Pye himself, as indicated above, suggested three; Almond also had three; Ward and Rustow, eight; Emerson, five; Eisenstadt, four.\textsuperscript{37} This all seems very reasonable, since political development clearly would appear to be a complex process. Yet, obviously also, this approach can lead to difficulties. What are the relationships among the component elements of political development? Thus, although Pye argued that equality, capacity, and differentiation constitute the development syndrome, he also had to admit that these do not “necessarily fit easily together.” On the contrary, “historically the tendency has usually been that there are acute tensions between the demands for equality, the requirements for capacity, and the processes of greater differentiation.” In a similar vein, Almond argued that “there is a tendency” for role differentiation, subsystem autonomy, and secularization “to vary together,” but that the relation between each pair of these three variables “is not a necessary and invariant one.”\textsuperscript{38} Almond, indeed, presented a two-way matrix with secularization and differentiation on one axis and subsystem autonomy on the other. He found some type of political system to occupy each of the nine boxes in his matrix. The question thus necessarily arises: What does political development mean if it can mean everything? On the other hand, if political development is defined as a unitary concept, the tendency is either to define it narrowly—as Huntington, for instance, did in identifying it exclusively with institutionalization—and thus to rob it of many of the con-

\textsuperscript{35} Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay,” pp. 389–93.


\textsuperscript{38} Pye, Aspects, p. 47; Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics, p. 306. For an intriguing analysis of some of these problems, see Fred W. Riggs, “The Dialectics of Developmental Conflict,” Comparative Political Studies, I (July 1968), 197 ff.
notations and the richness usually associated with it, or to define it very generally, as for instance Alfred Diamant did, which in effect masks a complex concept under a unitary label.\textsuperscript{39} A third problem in the definitional quest concerned the extent to which political development was a descriptive concept or a teleological one. If it was the former, it presumably referred either to a single process or to a group of processes which could be defined, in terms of their inherent characteristics, as processes. If it was a teleological concept, on the other hand, it was conceived as movement toward a particular goal. It was defined not in terms of its content but in terms of its direction. As in the more general case of modernization, the goals of political development were, of course, valued positively. The definition of political development in terms of goals would not have created difficulties if there were clear-cut criteria and reasonably accurate indices (e.g., the political equivalent of per capita Gross National Product) to measure progress toward those goals. In the absence of these, however, there was a strong tendency to assume that, because both scholarly analyst and, presumably, the political actors he was analyzing, wanted political development, it was therefore occurring. The result was that "Almost anything that happens in the 'developing' countries—coup\textquotesingle s, ethnic struggles, revolutionary wars—becomes part of the process of development, however contradictory or retrogressive this may appear on the surface.\textsuperscript{40} These definitional problems raised very real questions about the usefulness of political development as a concept. Referring to Pye\textquotesingle s list of ten definitions, Rustow argued that this "is obviously at least nine too many."\textsuperscript{41} In truth, however, one should go one step further. If there are ten definitions of political development, there are ten too many, and the concept is, in all likelihood, superfluous and dysfunctional. In the social sciences, concepts are useful if they perform an aggregating function, that is, if they provide an umbrella for a number of subconcepts which do share something in common. Modernization is, in this sense, an umbrella concept. Or, concepts are useful because they perform a distinguishing function, that is, because they help to separate out two or more forms of something which would otherwise be thought of as undifferentiated. In this sense, manifest functions and latent functions are distinguishing concepts.


\textsuperscript{40} Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," p. 390.

\textsuperscript{41} Dankwart A. Rustow, “Change as the Theme of Political Science” (Paper delivered at International Political Science Association Round Table, Torino, September 1969), pp. 1–2.
Political development in general is of dubious usefulness in either of these ways. To the extent that political development is thought of as an umbrella concept encompassing a multiplicity of different processes, as in the Almond and Pye cases discussed earlier, these processes often turn out to have little in common except the label which is attached to them. No one has yet been able to say of the various elements subsumed under the label political development what Lerner, at a different level, was able to say about the broader processes subsumed under the label modernization: that they went together because “in some historical sense, they had to go together.” Instead, it is clear that the elements included in most complex definitions of political development do not have to go together and, in fact, often do not. In addition, if political development involves differentiation, subsystem autonomy, and secularization, as Almond suggests, do not the really interesting and important questions concern the relations among these three, as Almond himself implies in his conclusion? The use of the term political development may thus foster a misleading sense of coherence and compatibility among other processes and obscure crucial questions from discussion. To the extent, on the other hand, that political development is identified with a single, specific process, e.g., political institutionalization, its redundancy is all the more obvious. What is to be gained analytically by calling something which has a good name by a second name? As either an aggregating concept or a distinguishing concept, in short, political development is superfluous.

The principal function that political development has in fact performed for political scientists is neither to aggregate nor to distinguish, but rather to legitimate. It has served as a way for political scientists to say, in effect: “Hey, here are some things I consider valuable and desirable goals and important subjects to study.” Such would indeed appear to be the principal function for the discipline served by the debates over the meaning of political development. This aspect of the use of the concept has perhaps been particularly marked in the arguments over the relation of democratization to political development and the perennial uneasiness faced by political scientists when they consider the issue: Is the Soviet Union politically developed? The concept of political development thus serves in effect as a signal of scholarly preferences rather than as a tool for analytical purposes.42

42 Some people may say that people in glass houses should not throw stones on the grounds that I did, after all, argue that political development should be defined as political institutionalization in my 1965 article on “Political Development and Political Decay.” My answer would be: true enough. But I do not mind performing a useful function by throwing stones and thus encouraging others to move out of their glass houses, once I have moved out of mine. In my 1968 book, Political Order in Changing Societies, which otherwise builds extensively on the 1965 article, the concept of political development was quietly dropped. I focus instead
The popularity of the concept of political development among political scientists stems perhaps from the feeling that they should have a political equivalent to economic development. In this respect, political science finds itself in a familiar ambiguous methodological position between its two neighboring disciplines. In terms of the scope of its subject matter, political science is narrower than sociology but broader than economics. In terms of the agreement within the discipline on goals, political scientists have more shared values than sociologists, but fewer than economists. Sociology is comprehensive in scope; economics is focused in its goals; political science is not quite one or the other. The eclecticism and diffuseness of sociological theory are excused by the extent of its subject. The narrowness and parochialism of economics are excused by the precision and elegance of its theory.

In this situation, it is quite natural for political scientists to borrow concepts from sociologists and to imitate concepts of economists. The sociological concept of modernization is, quite properly, extended and applied to political analysis. The concept of political development is created in the image of economic development. In terms of choosing its models, one might generalize, a discipline will usually tend to copy the more structured and “scientific” of its neighboring disciplines. This leads to difficulties comparable to those normally associated with the phrase “misplaced concreteness.” Economists, it will be said, do differ over what they mean by economic development and how one measures it. These differences, however, shrink to insignificance in comparison with the difficulties which political scientists have with the term political development. If, on the other hand, political scientists had modeled themselves on the sociologists and talked about political change in imitation of social change rather than political development in imitation of economic development, they might have avoided many of the definitional and teleological problems in which they found themselves.

**Approaches to political development** Many of the things that are often labeled studies in political development are not such in any strict sense. The study of political development is not the study of politics in societies at some given level of development. If this were the case, there would be few if any studies of politics which were not studies in political development, since those polities which are usually assumed to be developed are also presumably still developing. Yet not infrequently studies in the politics of less developed societies are treated as if they were studies in

on what I conceive to be the critical relationship between political participation and political institutionalization without worrying about the issue of which should be labeled “political development.”
political development. Tunisia, it is said, is a developing society; there-fore, its polity is developing polity; therefore, a study in Tunisian politics is a study in political development. The fallacy here is to look at the subject of the study rather than at the concepts with which that subject is studied. Depending on the concepts which were used and hence the questions which were asked, for instance, a study of John F. Kennedy's presidency might be a study in the uses of power, the institutionalization of an office, legislative-executive relations, consensus-building, the psychology of leadership, the role of intellectuals in politics. Or it could, conceivably, be a study in political development or political change. Exactly the same possibilities would exist for a study of Habib Bourguiba's presidency. There is nothing in the latter which makes it inherently more "developmental" than the former. Precisely the same is true for the innumerable studies of the role of the military, bureaucracy, and political parties in developing societies. More likely than not, these are simply studies of particular institutions in particular types of societies rather than studies in change or development. Depending upon the conceptual framework with which these subjects were approached, they could just as easily be studies in civil-military relations, organizational behavior, and political behavior, as studies in political development. They are the latter only if the categories employed are formulated in terms of change.

It could, of course, be argued that change is so pervasive that it is virtually synonymous with politics itself and that hence it cannot be studied as a separate subject. The rejoinder is that, to be sure, politics is change, but politics is also ideas, values, institutions, groups, power, structures, conflict, communication, influence, interaction, law, and organization. Politics can be studied, and has been studied, in terms of each of these concepts. Each sheds a different light on the subject, illuminates different areas, suggests different relationships and generalizations. Why not also analyze politics in terms of change or development?

In fact during the 1950s and 1960s a variety of scholars did just that. Many different approaches were employed. Without making any claim to inclusiveness or to systematic rigor, it is perhaps useful to focus on three of these approaches: system-function, social process, and comparative history.

System-function In the analysis of political development, a close relation existed between systems theory, in the strict sense, and structural-functional theory. It is, indeed, impossible to apply a functional approach without employing some concept of the political system. The varieties of theory encompassed in this general category are reflected in the names: Talcott Parsons, Marion Levy, David Easton, Gabriel Almond, David Apter, Leonard Binder, Fred Riggs. The principal contribution of these
scholars has been to develop a set of concepts and categories, central to which are those of "system" and "function," for the analysis and comparison of types of political systems. Among their other key concepts are: structure, legitimacy, input and output, feedback, environment, equilibrium. These concepts and the theories associated with them provide an overall model of the political system and the basis for distinguishing types of political systems in terms of the structures which perform the functions which must be performed in all political systems.

The advantages of the system-function approach clearly rest in the generality of the concepts which it deploys on the plains of analysis. One problem of the approach for the study of political change is the defect of this great virtue. It is primarily a conceptual framework. This framework does not necessarily in and of itself generate testable hypotheses or what are often referred to as "middle level generalizations." Scholars using the framework may come up with such hypotheses or generalizations, but it is an open question whether the conceptual framework is not more of a hindrance than a help in this respect. The approach itself provides little incentive for scholars to dig into empirical data. Indeed, the tendency is in just the opposite direction. The theory becomes an end in itself. It is striking how few facts there are not only in general works, such as Levy's two volumes, but even in case studies attempting to apply the system-function approach to a specific society, such as Binder's study of Iran. 43

A more fundamental problem is that this approach does not inherently focus on the problem of change. It is possible to employ the concept of "system" in a dynamic context, focusing on lags, leads, and feedback. In actuality, however, much of the theorizing on political development which started from a systems approach did not primarily employ these dynamic elements in that approach. The stress was on the elaboration of models of different types of political systems, not different types of change from one system to another. In his two-volume opus, Modernization and the Structure of Societies, Levy, for instance, is overwhelmingly concerned with the second element in his two-component title. The bulk of his work is devoted to discussing the characteristics of societies in general and then distinguishing between those of "relatively modernized societies" and of "relatively nonmodernized societies." The question of modernization and its political components gets short shrift in the first and last chapters of this 800-page work. As we noted earlier, Almond himself saw somewhat comparable limitations in the framework which he used in The Politics of Developing Areas. The much more elaborate and change-oriented

scheme which he and Powell present in *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* does not entirely escape from this difficulty. Among those works in the system-function tradition directly concerned with political development, David Apter's *The Politics of Modernization* has probably been most successful in bringing to the fore dynamic concerns with the rate, forms, and sources of change. Yet to the extent that he has done this, it has in large part flowed from his independent concerns with normative questions and ideologies, which are derived from sources other than the system-function framework which he also employs. The structural-functional approach, as Kalman Silvert has pointed out, was initially employed by social scientists interested in studying either very primitive societies (the anthropologists) or very complex societies (Parsons). It is an approach peculiarly limited in what it can contribute to the understanding of societies undergoing fundamental change. It is, moreover, rather ironic that political scientists should have seized upon this approach in order to study political change at the same time that the approach was coming under serious criticism within sociology because of its insensitivity to, and limited usefulness in, the study of change.

As has often been pointed out, a related difficulty in attempting to deal with change in this intellectual context is the extent to which the concept "equilibrium" also tends to be implicitly or explicitly linked to the system-function approach. The equilibrium concept presupposes the existence of a system composed of two or more functionally related variables. Changes in one variable produce changes in others. The concept, as Easton has pointed out, is closely linked with the ideas of multiple causation and pluralism. In addition, however, equilibrium also means that the variables in the system tend to maintain "a particular pattern of interaction."44 In its pure form the theory conceives of equilibrium as a state of rest. In all forms it presupposes tendencies toward the restoration of an original condition or a theoretically defined condition of equilibrium.

Equilibrium theory has obvious limitations as a framework for exploring political change. As one sociologist observed, the theory "does not attend to intrinsic sources of change, does not predict changes that have persistent directionality (but only those that restore balance if that is disturbed), and thus does not readily handle past changes that clearly affect the current state of the system."45 In effect, change is viewed as an extraneous abnormality. It is held to be the result of strain or tension, which gives rise to compensating movements that tend to reduce the strain or tension and thus restore the original state. Change is "unnatural"; stability or rest is "natural." Some thinkers have attempted to reconcile equi-

librium and change through the concept of moving equilibrium. By itself, however, this concept is inadequate to account for change. If the equilibrium remains the same but is itself moving as a whole, the concept does not explain the cause or direction of its movement. If the equilibrium is itself changing, then moving equilibrium really means multiple equilibria, and again some theory is necessary to explain the succession of one equilibrium by another.

Social process The social-process approach to political development starts not with concepts of the social system and the political system but rather with a focus on social processes—such as industrialization, urbanization, commercialization, literacy expansion, occupational mobility—which are presumed to be part of modernization and to have implications for political change. The emphasis is on the process, not the system. The approach is more behaviorally and empirically oriented than the system-function approach, and it typically leads to the accumulation of substantial amounts of data, often quantitative in nature (surveys or aggregate ecological data), about these social processes which it then tries to relate to political changes. While the scholar working with the system-function approach typically attempts to impute functions, the scholar employing the social-process approach attempts to correlate processes. He may attempt to move beyond correlation to causation and to shed light on the latter through various techniques of causal or path analysis.

The scholars most prominently associated with this type of approach to political development and related questions in the 1950s and 1960s included Daniel Lerner, Karl Deutsch, Raymond Tanter, Hayward Alker, Phillips Cutright, and Michael Hudson. The two most important early works, which stimulated much of what followed, were Lerner’s *The Passing of Traditional Society* (1958) and Deutsch’s 1961 article, “Social Mobilization and Political Development.” The system-function scholar begins with a concept of the political system, then differentiates different types or models of political systems, and finally attempts to spell out the consequences and implications of these distinctions. His approach typically is concerned with linking a pattern of action to the system as a whole, i.e., identifying its function within the system, while the social-process scholar is concerned with relating one pattern of action to another pattern of action.

The great virtue of the social-process approach is its effort to establish

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relationships between variables and particularly between changes in one set of variables and changes in another. In this respect, it does focus directly on change. Its limitations in dealing with change are threefold. First, more often than not, the variables which have been used concern levels of development rather than rates of development. Since it is empirically oriented, the variables employed are shaped by the availability of data. Data on levels of literacy in different societies at the same time (i.e., now) are easier to come by than data on levels of literacy in the same society over time. The latter, however, are necessary for longitudinal analysis and the use of rates of change in literacy. While cross-sectional analyses may be useful and appropriate in studying some types of relationships, they are also frequently inferior to longitudinal analyses in studying other types of relationships. The difficulty of getting data on the changes in variables over time in most modernizing societies in Asia, Africa, and even Latin America has consequently led many social-process analysts back to the study of Western European and North American societies. Here is a clear case where knowledge of political change or political development is advanced by studying developed rather than developing societies. A related difficulty is the extent to which the social-process approach has been applied primarily to the comparison of national societies, which are often units too large and complex to be useful for comparative generalization for many purposes.

A second problem in the social-process approach concerns the links between the usually social, economic, and demographic independent variable and the political dependent ones. The problem here is the general methodological one of the causal relationship between an economic or social change (which is in some sense “objective”) to political changes which are normally the result of conscious human effort and will. If the problem is, for instance, to explain voting participation in elections or the frequency of coups, how meaningful is it to correlate these phenomena with rates of economic growth, fluctuations in price levels, or literacy levels? The relation between the “macro” socioeconomic changes and “macro” political changes has to be mediated through “micro” changes in the attitudes, values, and behavior of individuals. The explanation of the latter is the weak link in the causal chain which is assumed to exist in most social-process analysis. To date, the most prevalent and effective means of dealing with this problem has been the various forms of the “relative deprivation” and “frustration-aggression” hypotheses utilized to relate socioeconomic changes to political instability. Finally, at the dependent end of the causal chain, social process analysts often have trou-

ble in defining political variables, identifying indices for measuring those variables, and securing the data required for the index.

One more general criticism which can be raised about the social-process approach concerns the extent to which it makes politics dependent upon economic and social forces. That the latter are a major influence on politics is obvious, and this influence is perhaps particularly important in societies at middle levels of social-economic modernization. In its pure form, which, to be fair, most of its practitioners rarely use, the social-process approach would leave little room for social structure and even less for political culture, political institutions, and political leadership. One of the great problems of the social-process approach to political change has been to overcome this initial deficiency and to find ways for assigning independent roles to cultural, institutional, and leadership factors.

Comparative history A third approach to political development is somewhat more diverse and eclectic than the two just considered. Its practitioners share enough in common, however, to be loosely grouped together. They start neither with a theoretical model nor with a focus on the relationship between two or more variables, but rather with a comparison of the evolution of two or more societies. What "the system" is to the system-functions man and "process" is to the social-process man, "society" is to the comparative-history man. He is, however, interested not just in the history of one society but rather in the comparison of two or more societies. The system-functions man conceptualizes; the social-process man correlates; the comparative history man, naturally, compares. Among social scientists concerned with political development who would fit primarily into this school are Cyril Black, S. N. Eisenstadt, Dankwart Rustow, Seymour Martin Lipset, Barrington Moore, Jr., Reinhard Bendix, and, in some measure, Lucian W. Pye and the members of the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics.

The work of these people tends to be highly empirical but not highly quantitative. They are, indeed, concerned with precisely those factors with which the social-process analysts have difficulty: institutions, culture, and leadership. Their approach is to categorize patterns of political development either by general stages or phases through which all societies must pass or by distinctive channels through which different societies may pass, or by some combination of these "vertical" and "horizontal" types of categories. Moore, for instance, distinguishes three patterns of modernization, under bourgeois (England, United States), aristocratic (Germany, Japan), and peasant (Russia, China) auspices. While he admits there may conceivably be a fourth way (India?), he is very dubious that this possibility will materialize. Consequently, every modernizing society will presumably have to find its way to modernity by way of liberal capitalism, reactionary fascism, or revolutionary communism. Cyril Black, on the
other hand, starts by identifying four phases of modernization through which all societies pass: the initial challenge to modernity; the consolidation of modernizing leadership; economic and social transformation from a rural, agrarian to an urban, industrial society; and the integration of society, involving the fundamental reordering of social structure. He then specifies five criteria for distinguishing among societies in terms of how they have evolved through these phases and proceeds to classify all contemporary societies into "seven patterns of political modernization" on the basis of these criteria. He thus combines vertical and horizontal categories into a truly all-encompassing scheme of comparative history, and he very appropriately subtitles his book, "A Study in Comparative History."  

In a slightly different vein, Dankwart Rustow and the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics have attempted to identify the types of problems which confront modernizing societies and to compare the evolution of these societies in terms of the sequences with which they have dealt with these problems. Rustow argues that there are three key requirements of political modernization: "identity is essential to the nation, authority to the state, equality to modernity; the three together form the political basis of the modern nation-state." The critical differences among societies concern the extent to which they had to deal with these problems simultaneously or sequentially, and, if the latter, the order in which these problems were dealt with. On the basis of comparative analysis, Rustow suggests that the identity-authority-equality sequence leads to the most successful and least traumatic modernization. In a somewhat similar spirit and parallel endeavor, the SSRC Committee identified five crises which societies would have to deal with in the process of political modernization: identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation, and distribution. A rough equivalence presumably exists between these two efforts as well as that of Almond:

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<th>Almond—Challenges</th>
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<td>nation-building</td>
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<td>state-building</td>
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<td>legitimacy, penetration</td>
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<td>participation, distribution</td>
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Interestingly, the SSRC Committee originally had a sixth crisis, integration, which concerned the "problems of relating popular politics to governmental performance. . ."50 This, however, turned out to be a rather nebulous and slippery crisis to handle; eventually it was dropped from the scheme.

The great virtue of the comparative-history approach is that it starts by looking at the actual evolutions of societies, attempts to classify those evolutions into patterns, and then attempts to generate hypotheses about what factors are responsible for the differences in patterns. It starts, in short, with the "real" stuff of history, at the opposite end of the methodological scale from the system-function approach with its abstract model of the system. Nor does it, like the social-process approach, assume that certain variables, such as urbanization and instability, can be lifted out and generalized about independently of their context. This approach thus clearly lacks generality. In effect, it comes back to a focus on the historically discrete phenomenon of modernization, and it deals with particular phases in the evolution of particular societies. Like most "developmental" analyses, its concepts are "less generalized than those of equilibrium analysis."51 In comparison to the system-function man with his conceptual complexity and the social-process man with his high-powered quantitative analyses, the comparative-history fellow often seems like a rather pedestrian, traditional plodder, whose findings lack theoretical and scientific precision. On the other hand, he is, unlike his competitors, usually able to communicate those findings to readers who will not read jargon and cannot read numbers.

Each of these three approaches has obviously contributed much to the study of political development. At the same time each has the defect of its virtues. From the viewpoint of a theory of political change, the system-function approach is weak in change, the social-process approach is weak in politics, and the comparative history approach is weak in theory. By building upon and combining the strengths of all three approaches, however, it may be possible to overcome the deficiencies of each.

IV. Theories of Political Change

The study of modernization and political development thus generated concern for the formulation of more general theories of political change. In the late 1960s the analysis of political change became in itself a direct focus of political science work, quite apart from any relations it might have had with the social-economic-cultural processes of modernization.

51 Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society, p. xv.
or the teleological preoccupations which underlay much of the work on political development. In the course of a decade the work of political scientists moved from a generalized focus on the political system to the comparative analysis of modern and traditional political systems, to a more concrete concern with the discrete historical process of modernization, to an elaboration of related concepts of political development, and then back to a higher level of abstraction oriented toward general theories of political change. The transition from the static theory to dynamic theory, in short, was made by way of the historical phenomenon of modernization.

These new theories of political change were distinguishable from earlier approaches because of several characteristics. First, the theoretical frameworks could be utilized for the study of political changes in societies at any level of development. Second, these frameworks were either unrelated to the process of modernization or, at best, indirectly related to that process. Third, the variables and relationships which were central to the theories were primarily political in character. Fourth, the frameworks were sufficiently flexible to encompass sources of change and patterns of change in both the domestic and the international environments of the political system. Fifth, in general the theories were relatively more complex than earlier theories of political modernization and political development: they encompassed more variables and looked at the more extensive relationships among those variables.

One transitional approach was presented by Huntington in his 1968 volume on Political Order in Changing Societies. In this volume, the central focus of political change is held to be the relationship between political participation and political institutionalization. The relationship between these determines the stability of the political system. The fundamental source of expansion of political participation is the nonpolitical socioeconomic processes identified with modernization. The impact of modernization on political stability is mediated through the interaction between social mobilization and economic development, social frustration and nonpolitical mobility opportunities, and political participation and political institutionalization. Huntington expresses these relationships in a series of equations:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \quad \frac{\text{Social mobilization}}{\text{Economic development}} &= \text{Social frustration} \\
(2) \quad \frac{\text{Social frustration}}{\text{Mobility opportunities}} &= \text{Political participation} \\
(3) \quad \frac{\text{Political participation}}{\text{Political institutionalization}} &= \text{Political instability}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{52}\) Huntington, Political Order, p. 55.
Starting with a central concern of the social-process approach to modernization, i.e., the relationship between socioeconomic changes (urbanization, industrialization), on the one hand, and the political participation, political instability, and violence, on the other, this approach thus attempts to introduce into the analysis elements of social (mobility opportunities) and political (political institutionalization) structure.

Huntington is concerned with the relationship between political participation and political institutionalization. The source of the former is ultimately in the processes of modernization. What about the sources of the latter? Here he is less explicit. Implicitly, however, he suggests that there are two principal sources. One is the political structure of the traditional society. Some traditional political systems are more highly institutionalized than others (i.e., more adaptable, complex, coherent, and autonomous); these presumably will be better able to survive modernization and accommodate broadened patterns of participation. In addition, Huntington suggests that at particular phases in the process of modernization certain types of political leadership (aristocratic, military, revolutionary) and certain types of conflict may also produce institutionalization.

The relationship between political institutionalization and political participation, however, is clearly one that can be abstracted from a concern with modernization. The latter may be one major historical source of changes in participation, but it need not be the only one. The problem of balancing participation and institutionalization, moreover, is one which occurs in societies at all levels of development. The disruptions involving Negroes and students in the United States during the late 1960s could be profitably analyzed from this framework. In central cities and in universities, existing structures were challenged to provide new channels through which these groups, in the cliché of the times, could "participate in the decisions which affect them."

This theoretical approach, originally focused on the relationship between two political variables, could be extended to include more or different ones. One of the striking characteristics of much of the work on political development was the predominance of concern with the direction of change over the concern with the objects of change. This, of course, reflected the origins of political development research in the study of the transition from traditional to modern society. The first step in analyzing political change, however, is simply, as William Mitchell put it, to identify "the objects that are susceptible to changes."53 It is to identify what are or may be the components of a political system and then to establish what, if any, relations exist in the changes among them. Such an approach focuses on componential change.

A political system can be thought of as an aggregate of components, all changing, some at rapid rates, some at slower ones. The questions to be investigated then become: What types of change in one component tend to be related to similar changes or the absence of change in other components? What are the consequences of different combinations of componential changes for the system as a whole? The study of political change can be said to involve: (1) focusing on what seem to be the major components of the political system; (2) determining the rate, scope, and direction of change in these components; and (3) analyzing the relations between changes in one component and changes in other components. The political system can be defined in a variety of ways and conceived of as having various components, as, for instance, the following five:

(a) culture, that is, the values, attitudes, orientations, myths, and beliefs relevant to politics and dominant in the society;

(b) structure, that is, the formal organizations through which the society makes authoritative decisions, such as political parties, legislatures, executives, and bureaucracies;

(c) groups, that is, the social and economic formations, formal and informal, which participate in politics and make demands on the political structures;

(d) leadership, that is, the individuals in political institutions and groups who exercise more influence than others on the allocation of values;

(e) policies, that is, the patterns of governmental activity which are consciously designed to affect the distribution of benefits and penalties within the society.

The study of political change can fruitfully start with the analysis of changes in these five components and the relations between change in one component and change in another. How is change in the dominant values in a system related to change in its structures? What is the relation between mobilization of new groups into politics and institutional evolution? How is turnover in leadership related to changes in policy? The starting assumption would be that, in any political system, all five components are always changing, but that the rate, scope, and direction of change in the components vary greatly within a system and between systems. In some instances, the rate of change of a component may approach zero. The absence of change is simply one extreme rate of change, a rate rarely if ever approximated in practice. Each component, moreover, is itself an aggregate of various elements. The political culture, for
instance, may include many subcultures; the political structures may represent a variety of institutions and procedures. Political change may be analyzed both in terms of changes among components and in terms of changes among the elements of each component.

Components and elements are the objects of change. But it is still necessary to indicate what types of changes in these are significant to the study of political change. One type of change which is obviously relevant is change in the power of a component or element. Indeed, some might argue that changes in power are the only changes with which political analysis should be concerned. But to focus on power alone is to take the meaning out of politics. Political analysis is concerned with the power of ideologies, institutions, groups, leaders, and policies. But it is also concerned with the content of these components and with the interrelation between changes in content and changes in power. "Power" here may have the usual meaning assigned to it in political analysis. The "content," on the other hand, has to be defined somewhat differently for each component. The content of a political culture is the substance of the ideas, values, attitudes, and expectations dominant in the society. The content of the political institutions of the society, on the other hand, consists of the patterns of interaction which characterize them and the interests and values associated with them. The content of political groups refers to their interests and purposes and the substance of the claims which they make on the political system. The content of the leadership refers to the social-economic-psychological characteristics of the leaders and the goals which they attempt to realize. And the content of policies, of course, involves the substance of the policies, their prescriptions of benefits and penalties.

The analysis of political change may in the first instance be directed to simple changes in the power of components and elements of the political system. More important, however, is the relation between changes in the power of individual components and elements and changes in their content. If political analysis were limited to changes in power, it could never come to grips with their causes and consequences. The recurring problems of politics involve the trade offs of power and content. To what extent do changes in the power of a political ideology (measured by

the number of people who adhere to it and the intensity of their adherence) involve changes in the substance of the ideology? Under what circumstances do rapid changes in the power of political leaders require changes in their purposes and goals (the "moderating" effects of power) and under what circumstances may the power of leaders be enhanced without significant changes in their purposes? History suggests, for instance, that professional military officers can acquire political power in liberal, socialist, or totalitarian societies only at the expense of abandoning or modifying the conservative military values. In most systems, the enhancement of the power of an ideology, institution, group, leader, or policy is bought at the price of some modification of its content. But this is by no means an invariable rule, and a variety of propositions will be necessary to specify the tradeoffs between power and content for different components in different situations. One important distinction among political systems may indeed be the prices which must be paid in content for significant increases in the power of elements. Presumably the more highly institutionalized a political system is, the higher the price it exacts for power.

Political change may thus be analyzed at three levels. The rate, scope, and direction of change in one component may be compared with the rate, scope, and direction of change in other components. Such comparisons can shed light on the patterns of stability and instability in a political system and on the extent to which change in one component depends upon or is related to change or the absence of change in other components. The culture and institutions of a political system, for instance, may be thought of as more fundamental to the system than its groups, leaders, and policies. Consequently, stability might be defined as a particular set of relationships in which all components are changing gradually, but with the rates of change in culture and institutions slower than those in other components. Political stagnation, in turn, could be defined as a situation in which there is little or no change in the political culture and institutions but rapid changes in leadership and policies. Political instability may be a situation in which culture and institutions change more rapidly than leaders and policies, while political revolution involves simultaneous rapid change in all five components of the system.

As a second level of analysis, changes in the power and content of one element of one component of the system may be compared with changes in the power and content of other elements of the same component. This would involve, for instance, analysis of the rise and fall of ideologies and beliefs, of institutions and groups, and leaders and policies, and the changes in the content of these elements associated with their

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changing power relationships. Finally, at the most specific level of analysis, attention might be focused upon the relation between changes in power and changes in content for any one element, in an effort to identify the equations defining the price of power in terms of purposes, interests, and values.

A relatively simple set of assumptions and categories like this could be a starting point either for the comparative analysis of the more general problems of change found in many societies or for the analysis in depth of the change patterns of one particular society. It could furnish a way of bringing together the contributions which studies of attitudes, institutions, participation, groups, elites, and policies could make to the understanding of political change.

A somewhat different approach, suggested separately by both Gabriel Almond and Dankwart Rustow, focused on crisis change and also provided a general framework for analyzing political dynamics. Earlier theories of comparative politics and development, Almond argued, could be classified in terms of two dimensions. To what extent did they involve an equilibrium or developmental models? To what extent were they predicated upon determinacy or choice? Reviewing many of the writers on these problems, Almond came up with the following classification:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approaches to Comparative Politics</th>
<th>Equilibrium</th>
<th>Developmental</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Determinacy</td>
<td>I Parsons</td>
<td>III Deutsch</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Easton</td>
<td>Moore</td>
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<td>Choice</td>
<td>II Downs</td>
<td>IV Harsanyi</td>
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<td>Leiserson</td>
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<td>Riker</td>
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He then went on to argue that each of these approaches has its appropriate place in the analysis of political change. Change from one state to another can be thought of as going through five phases. In the first phase, an antecedent equilibrium can be assumed to exist, and for the analysis of this phase Type I and Type II theories are most appropriate. Change can be assumed to begin with the impact on the equilibrium of exogenous variables from the nonpolitical domestic environment or from the international environment of the political system. These Phase 2 developments produce changes in the structure of polit-

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ical demand and in the distribution of political resources, and can be most appropriately analyzed by Type III theories. In the next phase, political factors—the changing structure of political demand and distribution of political resources—become the independent variables. Political leadership manipulates these variables so as to produce new political coalitions and policy outcomes. For this purpose, Type IV "coalition theory and leadership skill and personality theory" are most useful. In the next or fourth phase, these policy outcomes and political coalitions produce cultural and structural changes. The relations in this phase require analysis by all four types of theories. Finally, a new "consequent equilibrium" emerges in Phase 5, which again can be studied in terms of Type I and Type II theories.

In formulating this theoretical framework, Almond once again played a leading and a representative role in changing thinking on comparative politics. Unlike his earlier formulations, this framework was precisely designed to deal with the problem of change and it was also clearly independent of any particular historical context. It was not tied in with modernization. It was instead a general framework for the analysis of political change which could be applied to a primitive stateless tribe, a classical Greek city-state, or to a modern nation-state. It encompassed both political and nonpolitical variables and recognized that each could play both dependent and independent roles. Perhaps most significantly, it effectively incorporated leadership and choice into a model of political change. All in all, it neatly synthesized several conflicting approaches to development and change in such a way as to capitalize on the particular strengths of each. The model was especially relevant to the analysis of intense changes of limited duration. Hence, it is not surprising that Almond and his associates applied it to the study of clearly delimitable historical crises, such as the Reform Act of 1832, the creation of the Third Republic, the Meiji Restoration, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the Cádiz reform of the 1930s.57

In a parallel endeavor, Rustow came up with a somewhat similar model.58 Political change, he suggested, is the product of dissatisfaction with the existing situation. This dissatisfaction produces political action;

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57 For an initial application of the Almond model, see Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., "Crisis, Coalition-Building, and Political Entrepreneurship in the Mexican Revolution: The Politics of Social Reform under Lázaro Cárdenas," (Project on Historical Crises and Political Development, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, July 1969).

political action, indeed, is always the result of dissatisfaction. This action either succeeds or fails. If it succeeds, the organization, movement, or other group responsible for the success either develops new goals or it withers and dies. If its effort for change fails, either the group responsible for the effort dissolves or it continues to pursue its old objective with decreasing expectation of ever achieving it. In addition, Rustow argues, the forces involved in the creation of a government or the conquest of power by a group or individual are very different from those which sustain the government or keep the individual or group in power over the long haul. A theory of political change has to account for and to systematize these differences. Thus Rustow, like Almond, puts a primary emphasis on the choices which have to be made by political leadership.

A third approach to the analysis of political change was developed by Ronald D. Brunner and Garry D. Brewer. In their study of the political aspects of modernization, they developed a model of a complex change involving twenty-two variables and twenty parameters. Ten of the variables and eight of the parameters were disaggregated in terms of rural and urban sectors; three variables and three parameters constituted the demographic subsystem, nine variables and six parameters the economic subsystem, and ten variables and eleven parameters the political subsystem. The relations among these variables and parameters were expressed in twelve equations derived from general theories of modernization and from analysis of the evolution of Turkey and the Philippines from the 1940s to the 1960s. Their model included variables which could be directly influenced by governmental action and others not subject to such influence. Using the model it is possible to calculate the probable effects on support for the governments (measured by the proportion of the population voting for the government party) and on the standard of living (measured by per capita consumption) of governmental policy changes—such as birth control programs producing a 5 percent decrease in the rate of natural increase of population, increases or decreases of 5 percent in urban tax rates, and changes in the relative preference accorded the urban and rural sectors in governmental expenditures. Alternatively, one policy parameter—such as governmental preference for urban and rural sectors—can be intensively analyzed to demonstrate how various degrees of change within it might affect dependent variables such as government support and standard of living.

The Brunner-Brewer approach opened up new horizons in political analysis. Theoretically, it provided a highly simplified but highly precise

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model of a political system encompassing a significant number of demographic, economic, and political variables, the relations among which could be expressed by equations. Practically, it pointed scientific inquiry in a direction which could ultimately provide policymakers with a means of analyzing the probable consequences of policy choices for outcomes directly relevant to their purposes. In effect, this model building introduced into political science the type of complex analysis of relations among variables which has long prevailed in economics. On the other hand, the Brunner-Brewer approach was limited by its initial theoretical assumptions and the relevance of those assumptions to the actual political systems to which the model was oriented. The twelve-equation model furnished a reasonably good guide to the interaction of the variables and parameters in Turkey and the Philippines during the 1950s and 1960s. Its relevance to the future was based on the assumption that the structure of the model and the magnitude of the parameters did not vary over time. The model provided ways of testing the consequences of major changes in governmental policy or major changes in other variables brought about by other means. It did not provide means for predicting major changes of the system unless or until these changes were reflected in significant changes in some variables in the model. Thus, the model could not predict a military coup bringing to power a radical, nationalist junta of officers. Once such a junta came to power the model might be able to predict some of the consequences of new policies they introduced. Its ability to do this would depend upon the continued existence of the relationships among variables which had existed in the past. The first goals of the revolutionary junta might be to change those relationships. Thus, the usefulness of the Brunner-Brewer approach was limited by the degree of discontinuity in the political system.

These various theories of componential change, crisis change, and complex change all tended, in one way or another, to liberate political analysis from the static assumptions which had limited it in one earlier phase and from the teleological concerns with modernization and development which had preoccupied it in a later phase. They indicated increasing parallelism between the study of political change and the study of social change. Most important, they were the very modest and first steps toward the formulation of general theories of political dynamics, the initial response to Rustow's challenge: "Aside from the refinement of evolutionary models and the more sophisticated use of historical data, is it not time to introduce some notion of change into our very conception of politics itself?"60

60 Dankwart A. Rustow, "Modernization and Comparative Politics: Prospects in Research and Theory," Comparative Politics, I (October 1968), 51.